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ADJUDICATING ACTS OF STATE
IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS:
A POLITICAL QUESTION ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The power of a nation to attach legal consequences to conduct that
occurs outside of its territory is theoretically limited by recognized
principles of international law.' As a practical matter, however, each
nation has the ultimate power to determine the limitations it will
place on the extraterritorial reach of its own law. 2 In addition to being
subject to the limitations on the sovereign power of the United States, 3
the federal judiciary is further constrained by the Constitution and
congressional enactment. 4 Assuming that subject matter jurisdiction
as conferred by Congress is consistent with the judicial power as
defined by article III, 5 federal courts are indisputably competent to
resolve controversies between American nationals and foreign states.
Despite this unequivocal grant of jurisdiction, courts have crafted the
act of state doctrine, a superfluous limitation on the exercise of that
jurisdiction.
The act of state doctrine precludes American courts from inquiring
into the validity or legality of acts done by a foreign sovereign within
its own territory.6 Based on the constitutional separation of powers,
7
1. See Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77
Colum. L. Rev. 1247, 1249 & n.11 (1977) (discussing scope of extraterritorial juris-
diction under the Sherman Act) [hereinafter cited as Sherman Act Jurisdiction].
2. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 74, 85, 7 Cranch 116, 136
(1812); R. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order 27-28
(1964).
3. The issue of congressional authority to attach legal consequences to conduct
occurring outside of the United States was first raised in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Justice Holmes indicated that Congress did
not have the power to prescribe rules to govern such conduct. See id. at 355. Since
that time, however, the emphasis has shifted to the applicability of a particular
statute. Furthermore, the strict territorial approach of American Banana has been
liberalized to include acts that have an effect in the United States. Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979). However, the
absence of an applicable statute may still destroy the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court. See id. at 1292.
4. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
5. A congressional grant of subject matter jurisdiction is ultimately limited by
the requirements of article III. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320, 325-30 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 454
U.S. 1140 (1982) (81-920); see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512-16 (1969);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
6. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697
(1976)(plurality opinion); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401
(1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903,
908 (2d Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
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the doctrine is a product of juridical reluctance to interfere with the
conduct of foreign affairs.8 Its application places certain issues beyond
judicial scrutiny but does not affect the jurisdiction of a court.,
The act of state doctrine developed as a corollary to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity 10 and then assumed an existence of its own."
While sovereign immunity protected sovereign states from the exercise
of jurisdiction by American courts,' 2 the act of state doctrine pre-
cluded inquiry into the acts of those states and thus shielded private
defendants13 who either motivated the sovereigns' acts or benefited
from them. 14 Developments during the last decade, however, have
1292 (3d Cir. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
7. Although the text of the Constitution is not interpreted to require the act of
state doctrine, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976), the
doctrine does, however, have " 'constitutional' underpinnings." Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
8. The doctrine is compelled by neither the nature of sovereignty nor interna-
tional law, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964); Tim-
berlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976), despite some
assertions to the contrary. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d
876, 884 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1982). To the extent that courts have developed a conflict of
laws approach to the issue, the basic concern still lies in the potential affront to a
foreign government and the resulting difficulties in formulating and effecting foreign
policy presented to the executive branch. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976).
9. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763
(1972) (plurality opinion); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
10. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765
(1972) (plurality opinion).
11. See id.
12. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945); Ex parte Peru,
318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 576
(1926); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
13. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1036 (1982).
14. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964);
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,
252 (1897); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 302-03 (3d Cir. 1982);
Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 325-27 (5th
Cir. 1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 984 (1977). Hunt is probably the high water mark for application of the act of
state doctrine in antitrust cases against private defendants. The Second Circuit held
that the doctrine foreclosed inquiry into the motivation behind a Libyan expropria-
tion, thus removing the causal connection between the alleged conspiracy to diminish
competition among oil producing companies in Libya and the injury suffered by the
723
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precipitated a conflict between the two doctrines, 15 so that it has
become difficult to predict whether judicial resolution of a dispute
will be available to those who trade with foreign states.
In 1976, a plurality of the Supreme Court rendered a decision in
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba'6 that created a
commercial activities exception to the act of state doctrine. 17 That
same year, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (Act or FSIA), ' s which codified the American rule on sovereign
immunity' 9 and defined the subject matter jurisdiction of federal
courts in cases against foreign states.20 Despite historical and theoreti-
cal differences, the two doctrines can operate to effect the same
result-dismissal of suit. 2'
plaintiff. See id. at 72-73. Hunt has subsequently been criticized for being unduly
broad. Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 325
(5th Cir. 1982); see Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 304 n.5 (3d Cir.
1982); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980). Other circuits have refrained from applying the
act of state doctrine in such cases and have applied jurisdictional tests for the
extraterritorial reach of American antitrust laws. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883-86 (5th Cir. 1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lum-
ber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608-15 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Sherman Act
Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 1248. The doctrine might also be available in actions
brought under other statutory prohibitions, such as the antiboycott provision of the
Export Administration Amendments Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (Supp. IV
1980); see United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.) (act of state
doctrine raised as a defense in antitrust suit for boycott conspiracy prior to enactment
of the antiboycott statute), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981), and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1 to -2, 78ff (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); see McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Pay-
ments by Corporations: A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 Fordham L. Rev.
1071, 1104-05 (1978) (discussing use of act of state doctrine in antitrust prosecutions
"predicated on the paying of foreign bribes"). The act of state doctrine is distinct
from the sovereign compulsion defense, which arises when a private defendant's
conduct has been mandated by a foreign state. Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
694 F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 1982); McLaughlin, supra, at 1107; see Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962); Interamerican
Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1296-99 (D. Del. 1970).
The defense is not available to the foreign state. McLaughlin, supra, at 1107.
15. See infra notes 107-08.
16. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
17. Id. at 706 (plurality opinion).
18. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(c),
1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976)).
19. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 [hereinafter cited as House
Report], reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6605; Note, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Of 1976: Giving The Plaintiff His Day In Court,
46 Fordham L. Rev. 543, 543 (1977).
20. House Report, supra note 19, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6610.
21. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18
(1976) (plurality opinion). The commercial exception has not adequately prevented
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This Note argues that courts should not use the act of state doctrine
to limit the exercise of their judicial power in cases against foreign
states when sovereign immunity is not available. Given subject matter
jurisdiction under the FSIA, courts should restrict their inquiry to
whether the exercise of that jurisdiction in a particular case is consis-
tent with the requirements of article III. This Note suggests that the
political question doctrine provides a standard for making that deter-
mination and assures that adjudication will not unconstitutionally
infringe on powers that are reserved to the political branches.
I. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE:
HISTORY AND RATIONALE
The act of state doctrine developed out of the protean concepts of
international comity and sovereignty and was applied in American
courts chiefly out of respect for the separation of powers. As it ma-
tured, its rationale solidified in judicial deference to the executive in
the area of international relations. In the modern era, the doctrine
was reaffirmed and was recognized as having its roots in the Constitu-
tion, rather than in international law.
A. The Schooner Exchange and its Progeny
The act of state doctrine and the American doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity have a common origin in The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon,22 in which American plaintiffs alleged that the Ex-
change had been "forcibly taken" on the high seas and converted for
military use by the French.2 3 The Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
missal of the action,2 4 holding that foreign sovereigns are immune
from the jurisdiction of American courts. 25
In The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that
jurisdiction within national boundaries is "exclusive and absolute,"
that its surrender or limitation can occur only with consent of the
sovereign of the forum, 2 6 and that consent in this area was implied in
the practice of nations.2 7 The rule of The Schooner Exchange is that
the power to rescind consent does not lie in the judiciary, but is vested
the act of state doctrine from substituting for sovereign immunity. See International
Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
22. 11 U.S. 74, 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
23. Id. at 74, 7 Cranch at 117.
24. Id. at 92, 7 Cranch at 147.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 85, 7 Cranch at 136.
27. Id. at 85-86, 7 Cranch at 136-37.
1983]
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in the two political branches of government. 8 Although the principle
of sovereign immunity is now recognized as a principle of interna-
tional law,2 9 its application by the judiciary was mandated by the
domestic concern of separation of powers. 30
The Schooner Exchange also indicated that even when the power to
resolve certain issues might properly lie in the judiciary, the nature of
those issues suggests that they are better suited for diplomatic resolu-
tion. 31 Thus, the cases that follow The Schooner Exchange diverge
into two lines. In one line of cases, sovereign immunity was afforded
certain defendants and suit was barred for lack of jurisdiction; 32 in the
other, courts applied the act of state doctrine and refused to adjudi-
cate issues, resulting in dismissal of the suits. 33 This second line devel-
oped in cases in which the defendants were private parties but resolu-
tion of the dispute required adjudication of a sovereign act. 34 Rather
28. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 74, 85-86, 7
Cranch 116, 136-37 (1812).
29. See Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity,
50 Fordham L. Rev. 155, 162-63 (1981).
30. See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360-61 (1955);
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 74, 91, 7 Cranch 116, 146 (1812).
31. 11 U.S. at 91-92, 7 Cranch at 146. The inability of the judiciary to enforce its
decisions against foreign sovereigns, according to Chief Justice Marshall, also sup-
ported the argument that such cases should not be adjudicated. Id. The absence of an
effective remedy has more recently been characterized as an element of the political
question doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
This concern is diminished, however, by the provisions of the FSIA, under
which the execution of a money judgment against a foreign sovereign is made
possible. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1976); see also House Report, supra note 19, at
26-31, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6625-30. When appropri-
ate, a court may order an injunction or specific performance. Id. at 22, reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6621. However, enforcement of such an order
may not be possible if diplomatic immunity is available to shield foreign officials
from imprisonment for contempt. Id.
32. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945); Ex parte Peru,
318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 576
(1926); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(applying FSIA).
33. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964); Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 302 (3d Cir. 1982); Compa-
nia de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 325-27, 329 (5th Cir.
1982); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
After the demise of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, see infra note 96,
the doctrine was raised in cases against foreign sovereigns. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill
[Vol. 51
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than affect the jurisdiction of the court, the doctrine renders certain
issues nonjusticiable. 35
The "classic American statement" of the act of state doctrine36 is
found in Underhill v. Hernandez:
37
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves. 38
Although the doctrine as articulated in Underhill seems to rely on
concepts of sovereignty and comity among nations, 39 subsequent early
cases found the basis for the doctrine in other concepts.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 40 the Court applied
the rule of Underhill in an antitrust suit against a private defendant. 4'
By holding that a foreign sovereign acting within its own territory
"must be assumed to be acting lawfully," the Court suggested that
American law could not be applied to such acts. 42 This reasoning, in
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 n.12 (1976); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya,
482 F. Supp. 1175, 1178-79 (D.D.C. 1980).
35. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 78
n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). See infra notes 129-30 and accom-
panying text.
36. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972)
(plurality opinion); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
This has also been referred to as the "traditional formulation" of the doctrine. See
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 n.7 (1976).
37. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The plaintiff was an American citizen who brought an
action against the general of a revolutionary army in Venezuela. Underhill alleged
that Hernandez had refused to allow him to leave the country and had confined him
in his house. Underhill was eventually released, the revolution was successful, and
the United States recognized the rebels as the legal government of Venezuela. Id. at
251, 253. Given the fact that the revolution was ultimately successful, it has been
argued that sovereign immunity provided an independent ground for the decision.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).
38. 168 U.S. at 252.
39. See Sherman Act Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 1255-56.
40. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
41. Id. at 357-58.
42. Id. at 358; see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 726 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471
(1937). This approach has been characterized as a choice of law question. See
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979);
DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 548 F. Supp. 1370, 1373-74 (D. Hawaii 1982). In general,
however, courts have not relied on a choice of law theory. See, e.g., Industrial Inv.
Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
903 (1980); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Repub. of Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 &
1983]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
conjunction with the holding that the Sherman Act 43 does not apply to
acts committed outside the United States, 44 required the conclusion
that no "case" was presented to the Court.45
Another rationale for the act of state doctrine was developed in
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.4 There the Court relied on Underhill
and American Banana in support of "[t]he principle that the conduct
of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in
the courts of another."' 47 Thus, the issue of the validity of a foreign
expropriation was nonjusticiable. Also raised, however, was the issue
of whether the expropriating party was the legal sovereign of the
foreign state. 48 The Court held that "[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Gov-
ernment, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. ' 49 Cer-
tain issues are therefore nonjusticiable because the separation of
powers in the constitutional system would be violated.
While both issues in Oetjen raised separation of powers problems,
the determination of the legal government of a foreign state is more
clearly a pure political question 50 than is the examination of the
n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). Further, a choice of law
theory raises troubling questions about "federal common law" after Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 423-27 (1964); cf. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to
International Law, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 740, 742-43 (1939) (discussing effects of Erie on
ability of federal courts to choose applicable law in cases involving extraterritorial
conduct).
43. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
44. 213 U.S. at 357, 359; see Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982
Acts: The Continuing Need for Reassessment, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 201, 202 (1982).
The holding in American Banana that the Sherman Act does not apply to acts done
outside of the United States has not been strictly adhered to. Kintner & Griffin,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C.
Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 199, 207-19 (1977); see Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962); United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594
F.2d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
45. 213 U.S. at 359; cf. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979) (inapplicability of statute to conduct in question would
result in lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
46. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
47. Id. at 303.
48. Id. at 302-03.
49. Id. at 302.
50. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938). Oetien
has been cited by the Supreme Court as a "political question" case. See Baker v.
[Vol. 51
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governmental expropriation. While adjudication of either could "af-
fect" foreign relations, the question of recognition is more clearly
within the orbit of powers of the political branches. Oetien marks a
step in the transition from a doctrine based solely on the concept of
sovereignty and reflects judicial concern about infringing political
powers.51
B. Sabbatino and the Modern Doctrine
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino52 the Court reiterated the
traditional formula for the act of state doctrine as one which "pre-
cludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the
public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its
own territory. '5 3 The Court rejected the proposition that such cases
should be decided under standards of international law 54 and reaf-
firmed the applicability of the doctrine in expropriation cases. 55
In a discussion of the foundation of the doctrine, the Court chal-
lenged the idea that the doctrine is compelled by the "inherent nature
of sovereign authority" 56 or by international law. 57 Moreover, the
Court determined that the Constitution neither mandates the act of
state doctrine nor "irrevocably remove[s] from the judiciary the ca-
pacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state."'5 8 Instead, the
doctrine reflects the basic distribution of power within the federal
government and it rests on " 'constitutional' underpinnings." 59
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 & n.31 (1962). The Court, however, referred to its language
as a "sweeping statement" because not all cases that touch on foreign affairs violate
the separation of powers. Id. at 211; see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39
Harv. L. Rev. 221, 229 (1925); Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296,
315-16 (1925).
51. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766-67
(1972) (plurality opinion) (citing Oetien for the proposition that the act of state
doctrine is based on the separation of powers rather than sovereignty).
52. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
53. Id. at 401.
54. Id. at 428. The nature of the international law violation may, however,
affect a court's analysis when determining whether the act of state doctrine applies.
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), Judge Kaufman indicated
that the doctrine would not be a shield from liability in civil suits arising from the
torture of political prisoners in violation of international law. See id. at 889-90. In a
later case, Judge Kaufman commented on Filartiga and distinguished physical tor-
ture from commercial violations in determining whether subject matter jurisdiction
has been conferred by a breach of international law. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320, 325 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1140
(1982) (No. 81-920).
55. 376 U.S. at 428, 434-37.
56. Id. at 421.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 423.
59. Id.
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The rationale enunciated in Sabbatino echoes a chord first struck in
The Schooner Exchange: 60 The judiciary has limited powers to act in
foreign affairs.
The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong
sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of
passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather
than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for
the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere. 6'
The doctrine is loosely based on the separation of powers, but is not
mandated in the same sense that the political question doctrine is
mandated.6 2 Adjudication of an act of a foreign state is not a usurpa-
tion of the power to conduct foreign affairs. Yet a particular issue in a
particular case may be of such a nature that a judicial decision may
have repercussions in the conduct of foreign policy. It is in this grey
area, in which courts still have the power to act but hesitate to employ
that power, that the act of state doctrine is applied. 3
The separation of powers rationale was reaffirmed in 1972 in First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.6 4 A sharply divided
Court held that the act of state doctrine did not bar a counterclaim
against a foreign sovereign because the claim was merely a set-off to
the sovereign's recovery. 65 Justice Rehnquist issued the judgment of
the Court and wrote the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White joined in adopting the "Bernstein Excep-
60. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 74, 78, 7 Cranch 116, 123-24
(1812).
61. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
62. Although it has been suggested that a political question "doctrine" is not
required, see Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597,
600 (1976), it is generally recognized that certain issues are to be resolved by the
political branches of government, see id. at 601, and represent a limitation on the
power of the judiciary. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 45 (1961); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265 (1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1959).
63. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768-69
(1972) (plurality opinion); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J. 517, 577 (1966).
64. 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (plurality opinion).
65. See id. at 762, 768-69 (plurality opinion); id. at 771-72 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Subsequent opinions have agreed that this is the holding in City Bank. See
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 732-34 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1373 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
The plurality, however, limited its holding to the case before it, see 406 U.S. at
770, and Justice Powell, who concurred in the result, rejected this reasoning. See id.
at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
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tion." S This exception allows courts to adjudicate act of state issues if
the State Department renders an opinion that the adjudication will
not hinder American foreign policy. 7
A majority of the Court, however, expressly rejected the Bernstein
Exception. 8 Justice Douglas, concurring in the result, believed that
the exception would reduce the Court to a "mere errand boy for the
Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts
from the fire, but not others'. ' 69 Justice Powell also rejected the
exception on the ground that it would conflict with, rather than
preserve, the separation of powers. 70
The dissenters-Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Black-
mun-rejected the Bernstein Exception on the ground that even with
acquiescence by the executive, adjudication of act of state cases vio-
66. 406 U.S. at 768 (plurality opinion).
67. The exception takes its name from Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerik-
aansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam), in
which the Second Circuit declined to apply the act of state doctrine in an action to
recover property that had been expropriated by the German government. The court
reversed the position it had taken in an earlier decision in the same case on the basis
of a letter published by the State Department. The Department expressed the policy
of the executive branch as relieving "American courts from any restraint upon the
exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials."
Press Release No. 296, Apr. 27, 1949, titled "Jurisdiction of United States Courts Re
Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi Forced Transfers," reprinted in
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
Although Bernstein had been decided at the time of the Sabbatino decision, the
Court did not then rule on the validity of the exception because the executive branch
did not "make any statement bearing on this litigation." Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964).
68. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884 (2d
Cir. 1981); Cooper, Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: A Further Inquiry, 11
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 193, 224 n.142 (1980); see First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 772-73 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 773 (Powell,
J., concurring); id. at 790 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, courts continue to
seek the view of the executive branch on the applicability of the act of state doctrine
in particular cases. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903,
912 (2d Cir. 1981).
69. 406 U.S. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Justice Douglas' view, an
affirmative remedy would transform the controversy into a "political question." Id.
at 772 (Douglas, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell indicated that, had he
been on the Court, he would have joined Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino. Id. at
774 (Powell, J., concurring). Further, he disagreed with the concept
that balancing the functions of the judiciary and those of the political
branches compels the judiciary to eschew acting in all cases in which the
underlying issue is the validity of expropriation under customary interna-
tional law. Such a result would be an abdication of the judiciary's responsi-
bility to persons who seek to resolve their grievances by the judicial process.
Id. at 774-75 (Powell, J., concurring).
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lates the separation of powers. 71 Under this view, the breach in the
separation of powers wall allows infringement in two directions: The
judiciary becomes involved in foreign policy and the executive exer-
cises discretion that determines the fate of individual claimants.7 2
City Bank is noteworthy for demonstrating the division of the Court
on this issue as well as for the unanimous reaffirmation that the
foundation of the doctrine is the separation of powers. Although
Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[tihe act of state doctrine, like the
doctrine of immunity for foreign sovereigns, has its roots, not in the
Constitution, but in the notion of comity between independent sover-
eigns,"' 73 his analysis reveals that comity and sovereignty are not the
cornerstones of the doctrine. By adopting the Bernstein Exception, the
plurality made clear that the true problem is one of separation of
powers.
Two common elements are found in the cases following The
Schooner Exchange: a concern over the relationships among sovereign
nations in the international order and a concern over the allocation of
constitutional power within the American government. The relative
importance of these concerns shifted toward the separation of powers
rationale as the act of state doctrine evolved. Sabbatino and its prog-
eny ultimately accept the latter as a basis for the doctrine, while
displaying continued disagreement over its application. The question
raised and left unanswered in Sabbatino and City Bank is the degree
to which the judiciary can "affect" foreign affairs while carrying out
its article III duties.74
II. DUNHILL, THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT,
AND THE VIABILITY OF A COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION
Two developments that occurred almost simultaneously in the mid-
1970's necessitated a reappraisal of the act of state doctrine. In 1976,
the Supreme Court decided Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Repub-
lic of Cuba 7 and Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
71. Id. at 790-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The Executive Branch, however
extensive its powers in the area of foreign affairs, cannot by simple stipulation change
a political question into a cognizable claim." Id. at 788-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 791-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 765 (plurality opinion).
74. The power of the three branches of the federal government, taken together,
represents the total sovereign power of the United States in international affairs. See
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1936); cf.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436, 443 (1968) (discussing limitation on states'
power to act in international affairs). The Court has recognized that the judiciary has
the power to affect foreign affairs. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (not "every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
75. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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Act.76 These two developments have led to a discussion of whether a
commercial exception to the act of state doctrine exists or should
exist. 77
A. Dunhill and the FSIA
The Supreme Court followed City Bank with another decision in
which the application of the act of state doctrine was rejected. In
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,7 the Court held
that a government's mere refusal to honor an obligation, without
anything more, did not rise to the level of an "act of state."'79 Justice
White authored the opinion in which a majority80 joined this limited
holding. His opinion went further, however, and created a commer-
cial exception to the act of state doctrine in a section that attracted
only plurality support."' This exception requires that the doctrine not
be applied in any way that is inconsistent with the restrictive ap-
proach to sovereign immunity, 2 since codified by the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976.83
Under the restrictive theory, the grant of immunity for foreign
states depends upon the type of act that is the subject of the suit.8 4
Two categories of acts are recognized by this doctrine: acta jure
imperii, or public acts, and acta jure gestionis, or private and com-
mercial acts.8 5 In 1952, the Department of State issued the Tate
Letter, 8 which formally adopted the policy of recognizing immunity
76. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(c),
1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976)).
77. The commercial exception has drawn a generally favorable response from the
commentators. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 68, at 205-06; Friedman & Blau,
Formulating a Commercial Exception to the Act of State Doctrine: Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 50 St. John's L. Rev. 666, 678-79 (1976); Tim-
berg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and
Economic Coercion, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1976); Note, Rehabilitation and Exonera-
tion of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 599, 634 (1980); Note,
The Act of State Doctrine: The Need for a Commercial Exception in Antitrust
Litigation, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 813, 823-27 (1981).
78. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
79. Id. at 689-90.
80. Id. at 684.
81. Id. at 695.
82. See id. at 705.
83. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(c), 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
84. Hill, supra note 29, at 168.
85. Id.
86. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State,
to the Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), 26 Dep't St. Bull. 984 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Tate Letter], reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 app. 2 (1976).
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only for public acts 87 This action is consistent with the rule of The
Schooner Exchange that only the political branches have the power to
expand or restrict jurisdictional immunity. 8 Shortly after Dunhill was
decided, Congress enacted the FSIA,89 which codified the restrictive
approach to sovereign immunity and removed determinations of im-
munity from the executive and placed them with the judiciary 0
Under the FSIA, foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction 9'
of American courts except as provided by international agreements
and by sections 1605 to 1607 of the Act. 92 Pursuant to section
1605(a)(2), foreign states are subject to suit in the United States based
upon their commercial activity, with the minimum requirement that
the activity have a direct effect in the United States. 93 Congress specif-
ically required that the "commercial character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its pur-
pose."' 94 The fact that a public purpose underlies the commercial act is
irrelevant. 95
A principal intent of Congress was to remove the determination of
immunity from the executive branch and place it with the judiciary. 6
87. Hill, supra note 29, at 175-76; see Tate Letter, supra note 86, reprinted in
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 app. 2
(1976).
88. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 74, 91, 7 Cranch 116, 146
(1812).
89. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(c),
1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976)).
90. House Report, supra note 19, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6605-06.
91. Under the FSIA, immunity, subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdic-
tion are "intricately coordinated." Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Repub.
of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
93. Id. § 1605(a)(2). Section 1605(a)(2) provides that a foreign sovereign is not
immune from jurisdiction in any case
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.
94. Id. § 1603(d). The section also provides: "A 'commercial activity' means
either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction
or act."
95. See House Report, supra note 19, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6615.
96. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6606. In The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 74, 7 Cranch 116 (1812), the Court
indicated that the decision to revoke or limit the immunity of foreign states lay with
the political branches. See id. at 90-91, 7 Cranch at 143-44. Thus, the cases that
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This would depoliticize determinations of immunity by allowing the
judiciary to apply objectively the criteria set forth in the Act and
arrive at a predictable result.9 7 Litigants are thereby assured "that
these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process." 98s Moreover, this transfer
of responsibility defuses the political ramifications of the determina-
tion and lessens the impact on foreign relations. 9
Congress did not address the issue of the act of state doctrine in the
FSIA because it believed, as do some courts, 100 that Dunhill requires a
commercial exception to that doctrine. 10 While Congress did not
specifically prohibit application of the act of state doctrine in cases
that can be adjudicated under the FSIA, it indicated its belief that the
doctrine should not be applied when sovereign immunity is unavail-
followed The Schooner Exchange follow the theory of absolute immunity. See Berizzi
Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926).
The Supreme Court developed a policy of leaving the determination of immunity
in particular cases to the State Department, in reliance on the concept of separation
of powers and basing its result on a political question rationale. See Republic of Mex.
v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1943);
Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74
(1938). The Department subsequently adopted a formal policy of recognizing the
restrictive approach to immunity. See Tate Letter, supra note 86, at 985.
The role that the executive was granted in judicial proceedings came under heavy
fire. See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 Am. J.
Int'l L. 168, 169 (1946). The dissatisfaction with the procedure centered on the
absence of a rule of law that could be applied with consistency. See House Report,
supra note 19, at 8-9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6607;
President's Statement on Signing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 3
Pub. Papers, Gerald R. Ford 2609-10 (1979); Hill, supra note 29, at 175; Note,
Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 Yale L.J. 1167,
1175 (1982).
97. House Report, supra note 19, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6606. For a discussion of the way in which the FSIA has been applied, see
Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign Immu-
nity, Part 11, 85 Com. L.J. 228 (1980).
98. House Report, supra note 19, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6606.
99. Id.
100. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 984 (1977); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396,
401 (D.N.J. 1979); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 398 & n.28
(D. Del. 1978); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Repub. of Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622,
640-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Sage Int'l, Ltd.
v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Bokkelen v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The Depart-
ment of Justice has taken the position that the act of state doctrine does not apply to V/
commercial activity. See U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Guide for Int'l Operations
54-55 (1977).
101. Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 906 (E.D. Mich.
1981); see Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695
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able.10 2 It is clear that the Act must at least alter the doctrine for the
intended effect of the legislation to be realized. 10 3
(1976); House Report, supra note 19, at 20 n.1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6619.
102. Although it indicated that the Act "is not intended to affect the substantive
law of liability," House Report, supra note 19, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6610, the Judiciary Committee touched upon its view of the
applicability of the act of state doctrine in two areas and hinted at its position in a
third.
In the area of commercial activity, the Committee adopted the view taken by the
Solicitor General in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) that application of the
doctrine in cases involving commercial obligations would permit "sovereign immu-
nity to reenter through the back door, under the guise of the act of state doctrine."
House Report, supra note 19, at 20 n.1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6619; see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D.D.C.
1980). The Ninth Circuit, however, by looking to the purpose of a commercial act
rather than its nature, see International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354,
1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982), allowed the act of state
doctrine to bar adjudication where the FSIA denied immunity.
In cases involving expropriations, the Act denies immunity when "rights in prop-
erty taken in violation of international law are in issue." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)
(1976). This includes the "nationalization or expropriation of property without pay-
ment of . . . prompt adequate and effective compensation" and "takings which are
arbitrary or discriminatory." House Report, supra note 19, at 19-20, reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6618. On the issue of expropriations, the
Committee stressed that the section does not affect the applicability of the act of state
doctrine; instead, it cited the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(1976), which prohibits the application of the act of state doctrine in expropriation
cases. See House Report, supra note 19, at 20, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6618. Although the Committee did not address the issue, courts have
narrowed the Amendment's application to expropriations of tangible property situ-
ated outside of the territory of the expropriating sovereign. See Empressa Cubana
Exportadora de Azucar y sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d
Cir. 1981); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, 542 F.2d 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1976);
Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds
sub noma. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 399-402 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); see
also Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 43 (1965); Crockett, Extra-
territorial Expropriations, 13 Ind. L. Rev. 655, 657 (1980). Section 1605(a)(3) has
recently been interpreted to correspond to the meaning given to the language of the
Hickenlooper Amendment. See Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero
Del Pacifico S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). If this interpretation
stands, the act of state doctrine, sovereign immunity, and federal court jurisdiction
will have merged in the area of expropriations.
Finally, the Committee hinted at its position on the applicability of the act of state
doctrine in antitrust cases. The legislative history reveals that § 1603 is not intended
"to alter the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act." House Report, supra note 19,
at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6618. The Committee then
cited two cases that upheld the applicability of the Sherman Act to acts committed
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B. Problems with a Commercial Exception
The commercial exception in Dunhill was designed to parallel the
restrictive approach to sovereign immunity1 0 4 as it was outlined in the
Tate Letter.'0 5 The provisions of the FSIA, subsequently enacted,
disturbed this symbiotic relationship. The FSIA bars a grant of immu-
nity to sovereign states for commercial conduct under certain circum-
stances.' 0 A foreign state's immunity, however, is further circum-
scribed by other provisions in the Act. For example, under section
1605(a)(1), a sovereign may waive the right to immunity. 107 Under
outside of the United States. See id. (citing United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. &
Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E.
Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969)).
Suits against foreign sovereigns or their instrumentalities that were decided subse-
quent to the enactment of the FSIA have not been uniform in their interpretation of
whether the commercial exception to immunity applies to anticompetitive behavior.
See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 907 & n.21 (E.D. Mich.
1981) (some antitrust conspiracies are not commercial); Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 394-96 (D. Del. 1978) (commercial exception applies).
Assuming that a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine is viable, however,
there is at least some agreement that it is coextensive with the immunity exception in
the antitrust area. See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 907
(E.D. Mich. 1981); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 398 & n.28
(D. Del. 1978); cf. National Am. Corp. v. Federal Repub. of Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622,
640 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Congress intended FSIA and act of state doctrine to be inter-
preted "in tandem"), af'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
103. The Ninth Circuit has held that the FSIA does not affect application of the
act of state doctrine. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354,
1359 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
104. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705
(1976) (plurality opinion).
105. See Tate Letter, supra note 86.
106. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976). A foreign state may waive immunity explicitly
in either a treaty or a contract with a private party. House Report, supra note 19, at
18, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6617. The right to immunity
may be implicitly waived when a foreign sovereign has agreed that the law of
another country should govern a contract. The filing of a responsive pleading with-
out raising immunity as a defense may also result in a waiver. Id.; see Libyan Am.
Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1178-79 (D.D.C.
1980) (act of state doctrine applied where sovereign had waived immunity). Section
1607 of the Act denies immunity to foreign sovereigns for counterclaims that arise out
of "the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign
state," 28 U.S.C. § 1607(b) (1976), and, in any case, the sovereign is not immune
from a set-off. See id. § 1607(c). Courts have not been uniform in determining
whether the act of state doctrine is coextensive with the FSIA in this area. See
Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2d Cir. 1982) (both
FSIA and the act of state doctrine bar a cross-claim against a foreign sovereign);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884 (2d Cir.
1981) (act of state doctrine does not bar a set-off to a sovereign's claim); Empresa
Cubana Exportadora De Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231,
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section 1605(a)(3), grants of immunity are proscribed in actions over
the expropriation of property. 08 Although the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment0 9 similarly prohibits the application of the act of state doctrine
in expropriation cases, subsequent court decisions have sapped the
Amendment's vitality and the doctrine is still available in many
cases. " 0 Therefore, even a modified doctrine frustrates the purposes of
the FSIA.
The very existence of the exception is put in doubt because it was
recognized by only a plurality of the Court.' The majority based its
holding on the narrower ground that no act of state occurred suffi-
cient to invoke the act of state doctrine."12 Although some courts have
read Dunhill to create such an exception, " 3 it has not gained universal
acceptance. 1 4 Furthermore, there is a serious question as to the
soundness of such an exception given the fundamental reasons for the
existence of the doctrine.
The Dunhill plurality returned to the concept that both sovereign
immunity and the act of state doctrine are rooted in respect for
sovereignty as well as concern for maintaining the separation of
powers. 115 The soundness of a commercial exception rests on the as-
sumption that some acts of foreign sovereigns are less "sovereign""16
than others, that adjudication of these acts is less likely to touch on
"national nerves," 117 and that the separation of powers is preserved
because judicial action will not affect foreign relations.""
238-39 (2d Cir. 1981) (FSIA and act of state doctrine are not coextensive and the act
of state doctrine bars a counterclaim even where FSIA denies immunity); In re Oil
Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of Fr. on Mar. 16, 1978, 491 F. Supp. 161,
169 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (act of state doctrine is not applicable to counterclaim arising
under § 1607).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976). See supra note 102. In First Nat'l Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W.
3460 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982), the Second Circuit held that a commercial exception to
the act of state doctrine would not bar application of the doctrine in a case arising out
of a foreign expropriation. Id. at 902. The court did not analyze the problem,
however, under the FSIA because it did not reach the issue of sovereign immunity.
See id. at 900 n.6.
109. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
110. See supra note 102.
111. Three members of the Court joined in Part III of Justice White's opinion,
which contains the commercial exception. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Repub-
lic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976) (plurality opinion).
112. Id. at 692 n.8, 694.
113. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 984 (1977); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Repub. of Nig., 448 F. Supp.
622, 640-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
114. Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mich.
1981); Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 332-33 (E.D.N.Y.
1977).
115. See 425 U.S. at 694, 697, 703-04 & n.16 (plurality opinion).
116. Id. at 695-97 (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 703-04 & n.16 (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 697-98 (plurality opinion).
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While the creation of such an exception prevents the act of state
doctrine from substituting for sovereign immunity in some instances, a
consideration that gains importance after the enactment of the FSIA,
it is fundamentally unsound in light of the stated purposes of the
doctrine. Two concerns must be addressed in determining the efficacy
of a commercial exception: the likelihood that adjudication will in
fact affront a foreign sovereign and adversely affect foreign relations,
and the extent to which the exception undermines the structural con-
stitutional allocation of discretion among the branches of the federal
government.
Judicial classification of an act as "commercial" does not automati-
cally dissipate foreign policy implications. First, the assumption that
commercial acts can be adjudicated without affronting foreign states
is viable only under American concepts of the role of government.
Dunhill analogizes to the distinction drawn between American states
acting in their governmental capacity and acting as commercial enti-
ties.119 This distinction, however, does not translate well to some
foreign economic systems, in which the line between the private sector
and government is blurred or nonexistent. Thus, the basic premise
that commercial acts are less sovereign may itself be an affront to the
sovereignty of foreign governments that will have their conduct
judged.
Another problem in the foreign relations context arises from the fact
that the foundation of the act of state doctrine requires an analysis of
the commercial character of a sovereign act that is irreconcilable with
the analysis prescribed by the FSIA. The FSIA dictates an analysis
that considers only the nature of governmental acts and not their
purpose.12 0 The act of state doctrine, on the other hand, may require
an examination of the sovereign's purpose.' 2' The adjudication of
some commercial acts may be as likely to strike upon "national
nerves" as the adjudication of most public acts. For example, a sover-
eign state that contracts to provide for its own defense may object to
judicial scrutiny of the agreement. Even seemingly innocuous com-
mercial acts may represent sensitive national policies or may be cru-
cial to the maintenance of a state-run economy.1
22
119. See id. at 696 (plurality opinion).
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
121. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir.
1982) (commercial exception does not apply when the sovereign is acting in the
public interest), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). Such an examination would
apparently violate the basic tenet of the doctrine by requiring judicial inquiry into
the sovereign's purpose before it had even been determined that the commercial
exception applies.
122. See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 907 & n.21
(E.D. Mich. 1981).
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Thus, excepting commercial acts from the application of the act of
state doctrine is not consistent with the foreign policy goals of the
doctrine. At the same time, such an exception does not assuage the
domestic concern for maintaining the separation of powers for three
reasons. First, if adjudication of commercial acts is as likely to affect
foreign affairs as is the adjudication of other controversies, then the
line between the executive and the judiciary is blurred rather than
clarified. Second, the determination of which acts are commercial is
as much a policy decision as is the determination of the "validity" of
an act. Finally, the FSIA enlarges and clarifies the jurisdiction of
federal courts and depoliticizes the fact of adjudication. Thus, the
exercise of judicial power in cases that arise under the FSIA should not
be limited by the act of state doctrine, even with a commercial
exception. The rationale of the doctrine focuses on the effect of the
decision rather than on the act of decision-making. Armed with an
unequivocal grant of jurisdiction, courts should restrict their inquiry
to whether the exercise of that jurisdiction is consistent with its article
III powers.
A commercial exception, then, is unsatisfactory because it is incon-
sistent with the goals and rationale of the act of state doctrine. At the
same time, it does not satisfactorily integrate the changes wrought by
the FSIA. On the other hand, application of the act of state doctrine
in undiluted form is also unacceptable because it frustrates the intent
of the FSIA, is unnecessarily broad and rigid, and deprives American
plaintiffs of recourse to American courts. Other doctrines of justicia-
bility, generally grouped under the heading of political questions,
have stronger ties to the Constitution. Moreover, they function as a
sufficient restraint on the judiciary to avoid the infringement of politi-
cal power.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE To THE AcT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine is not required by the text of the Constitu-
tion, nor would its demise disturb the balance of powers in the federal
government. By contrast, the political question doctrine is inextrica-
bly bound to the Constitution, and its application preserves this bal-
ance. Although the political question doctrine has long been a source
of controversy, 2 3 its various principles provide a sturdier basis for
determining justiciability than does the act of state doctrine.
123. For representative examples of the commentary and divergent viewpoints in
this enduring debate, see, in chronological order, Weston, supra note 50 (1925);
Finkelstein, supra note 50 (1926); Jaffe, supra note 62 (1958); Wechsler, supra note
62 (1959); Bickel, supra note 62 (1961); Scharpf, supra note 63 (1976); and Henkin,
supra note 62 (same).
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A. Expendability of the Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a product of juristic concern for main-
taining the separation of powers in American government. Interna-
tional law defines the jurisdiction of the United States and not the
power of its courts;' 24 to the contrary, international conventions en-
courage the courts of nations to exercise jurisdiction for the purpose of
creating a body of judicially cognizable international law.'2 5 The
absence of a doctrine analogous to act of state in most other coun-
tries 2 6 further demonstrates that the doctrine is not required by the
relationship among nations but instead is peculiarly American. There-
fore, all jurisdictional limitations on the judiciary are imposed by the
Constitution 27 and by Congress pursuant to its power to create or
destroy the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.12 8 In an exercise of
this power, Congress has granted jurisdiction to the courts in cases
against foreign states within the limitations of the FSIA.
124. See R. Falk, supra note 2, at 27-52.
125. See Statute of the International Court of Justice § 38(l)(d) (1945), reprinted
in W. Friedmann, International Law 1183, 1191 (1969); see also First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775-76 (1972) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934), quoted in Jessup, supra
note 96, at 172; R. Falk, supra note 2, at 12.
126. See Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 826, 844 (1959) (act
of state only applied in the United States, Great Britain and Holland).
127. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n.7 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 94 (1968). Article III, § 2, cl.1 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admi-
ralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-
between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of differ-
ent States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
The Eleventh Amendment also delimits the power of the judiciary: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
128. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."). For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) provides:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." See also The Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976) (limiting power of federal courts to
grant injunctions in labor disputes).
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The act of state doctrine does not affect jurisdiction but rather
renders certain issues nonjusticiable.129 Nonjusticiability rests on the
" 'constitutional' underpinnings"130 of the separation of powers doc-
trine. It is reasoned that judicial intervention in foreign affairs is
prohibited because the Constitution grants the executive branch exclu-
sive power in this area. Therefore, adjudication of the acts of foreign
sovereigns conducted within their own territory complicates the exec-
utive's exercise of its constitutionally assigned power.' 3'
The act of state doctrine limits the exercise of judicial power when
jurisdiction is admittedly present, with the intent of restricting the
secondary effects of judicial decisions. 32 The political question doc-
trine, by contrast, is designed to prevent the substitution of judicial
discretion for that of the legislative or executive branches. While its
purpose has been to preclude judicial review of actions by domestic
129. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.,
621 F.2d 1371, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1980); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Repub. of
Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afJ'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.
1979); see First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972)
(plurality opinion).
A federal court lacks jurisdiction when "the cause either does not 'arise under' the
Federal Constitution, laws or treaties (or fall within one of the other enumerated
categories of Art. III, § 2), or is not a 'case or controversy' within the meaning of that
section; or the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
The jurisdiction of a court is not to be confused with the jurisdiction of the nation
in which the court sits. A federal court may have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant and yet the United States may not have jurisdiction over the extraterritor-
ial acts in question. However, the FSIA provides for this contingency in cases that
arise under the commercial activity exception to immunity by requiring that such
activity have a direct effect in the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law (1965) provides that "[a] state
has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory." Id. § 18.
The Judiciary Committee believed that the provisions of § 1605(a)(2) are consistent
with this principle. See House Report, supra note 19, at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6618. This is known as the doctrine of objective territo-
rial jurisdiction. See Note, Sherman Act Litigation: A Modern Generic Approach To
Objective Territorial Jurisdiction and the Act of State Doctrine, 84 Dick. L. Rev. 645
(1980).
130. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
131. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui &
Co., 594 F.2d 48, 51-52 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980). Yet not
"every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cogni-
zance." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
132. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 180 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
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governmental branches, 133 not the actions of foreign governments,'134
the political question doctrine would also function as a sufficient
restraint on the judiciary in cases against foreign states.
B. The Political Question Alternative
The political question doctrine defines the scope of the judiciary's
power to review executive and legislative actions.135 Applied in its
pure form, it prohibits judicial review unless constitutional violations
have occurred. 13 It has been suggested that the doctrine merely re-
quires that the judiciary give effect to the actions of the political
branches when they have the "political authority under the Constitu-
tion to do it." 37 For example, the executive has the power to make
executive agreements or, with the consent of the legislature, treaties to
resolve international disputes. 38 To the extent that these essentially
political products are constitutionally promulgated and do not by
their terms violate the Constitution, they are not subject to an imposi-
tion of judicial wisdom. 139
The political question doctrine also defines what the judiciary can
do in the absence of the exercise of political power. Two of the
"prominent"' 40 principles of the political question doctrine, which
have developed in separate lines of cases, preclude the exercise of
judicial discretion when that discretion is "textually committed" ' 4' to
a coordinate branch and when "judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards" for the resolution of a dispute do not exist. 42
133. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) (plurality opinion); Cole-
man v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939). The political question doctrine, how-
ever, is not a blanket prohibition of judicial review of the actions of the political
branches. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-93 (1974); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952).
134. The "political question" cases in the area of foreign relations involve only the
actions of the domestic political branches of government. See Chicago & S. Air Lines
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
135. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
136. Henkin, supra note 62, at 601.
137. Id.
138. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 & n.8, 680 (1981); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
139. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (the Chinese
Exclusion Case).
140. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
141. Henkin, supra note 62, at 603-05; see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
("textually demonstrable constitutional commitment").
142. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). There is disagreement over the
existence of a third element to the political question doctrine: a "prudential" concern
for respect among the three branches and the need to avoid multiple pronouncements
on a single issue. The "strict-constructionist" view holds that courts have a duty to
hear cases where the power to do so exists. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404,
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Applied to the act of state cases, 143 the first principle would pro-
scribe judicial action in certain instances because the power to exercise
jurisdiction over the subject matter lies solely in another branch. For
example, a determination of which nation is the sovereign of a dis-
puted territory is a power that the Constitution has been interpreted
to grant to the executive branch. 144 A court deciding the issue of
territorial sovereignty would be acting beyond its powers even if the
FSIA purported to grant jurisdiction.145
6 Wheaton 120, 181 (1821) ("We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution."); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
177-78 (1803); Henkin, supra note 62, at 610-13; Wechsler, supra note 62, at 1-8; see
also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006-07 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the
political question doctrine precludes review of questions "constitutionally commit-
ted" to another branch) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). Gilligan
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973) (certain questions are to be resolved by the elected
branches); cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (plurality opinion) (the
political question doctrine does not apply to the federal judiciary's relationship to the
states). The contrary view assumes that the judicial power encompasses the ability to
decline to hear cases where jurisdiction and article III power exist. See Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962); Bickel, supra note 62, at 46; Scharpf, supra note 63, at 573. The
Court's opinions that espoused this view, however, did not rely on it for the result in
the case that was presented. See Henkin, supra note 62, at 617. The same division
appears in the act of state cases. If such abstention is not required by the Constitu-
tion, then the prudential power must exist for the act of state doctrine to be viable.
See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972)
(plurality opinion); id. at 788 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 433 (1964). A strict constructionist view would hold that
there is no power that is vested in the judiciary that would allow the application of
the act of state doctrine. See id. at 450-53 (White, J., dissenting); cf. First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 774-75 (1972) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (broad holding of Sabbatino represents an "abdication of the judiciary's respon-
sibility"). Indeed, it can be argued that application of the act of state doctrine is a
usurpation of legislative power. Cf. Henkin, supra note 62, at 598 n.3. The doctrine
has also been considered a product of federal common law. See id.; Note, The
Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to International Cartels Involving Foreign Gov-
ernments, 91 Yale L.J. 765, 780 (1982).
143. Although the words "political question" have appeared in act of state opin-
ions, see First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 772 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring), the doctrine as enunciated in Sabbatino is not an element
of the political question doctrine. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166,
180-81 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
144. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962); see also Occidental of Umm al
Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Daunt-
less Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928
(1979).
145. Cf. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1981)
(the FSIA cannot confer jurisdiction in cases between aliens where article III power
does not exist), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1140 (1982) (No. 81-920).
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In the second line of political question cases, an issue is nonjusticia-
ble because no standards exist that can be applied to arrive at a
resolution.' 46 Thus, if no controlling treaty,' 47 executive agreement or
recognized principle of international law 148 exists, or if a court deter-
mines that American law does not apply,' 49 the issue is clearly nonjus-
ticiable.
The political question approach is more flexible than the rigid and
non-evolutionary act of state doctrine. It is responsive to developing
principles of international law and would increase the classes of cases
that can be adjudicated. It would preserve the separation of powers
while promoting the full and efficient use of judicial power. With
fewer plaintiffs turned away from the courthouse, disputes among
those who trade in international markets can be resolved according to
consistent and predictable rules of law, rather than go unresolved or
precipitate tensions among nations.
CONCLUSION
The act of state doctrine represents a singular abdication of judicial
power. Invoking prudence, courts continue to apply a doctrine of
tenuous origin, strained development and current uncertain bounda-
146. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 454-55 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 43, 7 Howard 1, 40 (1849).
147. See American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522,
525 (D.D.C. 1980) (act of state doctrine is not applicable if a treaty sets forth
controlling principles of international law). But see Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share
Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp. 1224, 1230-31 (W.D. Mich.
1982) (act of state doctrine applies where treaty is "susceptible of multiple interpreta-
tion" and interpretation by court may conflict with the executive branch). Article VI
of the Constitution "provides that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the
land." Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2; see also United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 68-
69, 1 Cranch 103, 109-10 (1801).
148. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686, 714 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); R. Falk, supra note 2. The degree of consensus on interna-
tional legal principles is a consideration in act of state cases. Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC,
649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). However,
the analysis that is employed does not seek the standards to be applied but rather
measures the effect on foreign relations by determining the degree of acceptance of
the principles in question. See id. A case arises under either international law or
American law, and the applicability of a statute should not be determined solely on
the basis of its popularity. The Court in Sabbatino was addressing the question of
whether a governmental expropriation violated international law and whether the
existence of such a violation should allow an exception to the act of state doctrine. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-37 (1962). The Court did
not suggest that American laws must conform to international law to be applicable to
foreign states.
149. See supra notes 3, 129.
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ries. Although a commercial exception might destroy the efficacy of
the act of state doctrine in the majority of cases, the confusion regard-
ing its scope undermines the predictability and preeminence of rules
of law. In cases that fall outside the exception, the doctrine still stands
as an unjustified anachronism. In its stead, the judiciary should draw
strength from the Constitution and subject itself to only its limitations.
No! in thunder' 50 to the act of state doctrine.
Brian S. Fraser
150. The Melville Log 410 (J. Leyda ed. 1951) (letter from Melville to Hawthorne,
Apr. 16, 1851).
